The outlook for the new transalpine Turin-Lyon railway is becoming increasingly uncertain. Until now, official documents and the various intergovernmental meetings on this project, whose key element is the Mont Cenis base tunnel, have consistently underlined a clear intention to press ahead, given its strategic importance for Europe. Brussels, meanwhile, has never withdrawn its assurances over co-financing for the project, covering up to 55% of the 65-kilometre Italian-French section, with the possibility of EU resources also being invested in the national alignments.
However, while political reassurances have never been lacking, it must also be acknowledged that Europe’s budgetary policy is based on rigid multiannual plans that do not allow flexible adjustments in response to immediate needs. So far, political promises have not been effectively translated into European economic planning documents. In other words, funding for the Turin-Lyon line has been slow to arrive and only part of it has so far been allocated, including the €700 million granted in July 2024 through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), followed by a similar allocation indicated in December 2025 for the Italian section, namely the Orbassano-Avigliana variant.
These partial allocations, spread over time, point to the possibility of repeated delays. Moreover, according to some observers, not necessarily from the No TAV movement or opposition groups, there is still no clear answer to the fundamental question of who should pay for the entire project. The risk is that, in the absence of EU resources, whether denied or delayed, Italy and France would have to foot the bill directly. By way of example, the international section alone, including the base tunnel, would cost €14.7 billion according to Cipess (Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning and Sustainable Development). This issue is part of an increasingly unstable and uncertain political context and, rather than being resolved, it was further fuelled during the Italy-France Intergovernmental Conference in Chambéry on 17 June 2026, when financial coverage returned to the centre of the discussion.
The most explicit intervention from this point of view, and in some respects unexpected for its realism, came from Mathieu Grosch, the European coordinator for the TEN-T Mediterranean Corridor. While confirming European political support for the Turin-Lyon project, the coordinator also frankly highlighted the issues that now affect its delivery, namely the availability of funding through to the final phase and French delays in planning the national access routes. At this stage, according to the coordinator, the question is how to continue the project, since it is not necessarily possible to rely solely on traditional public transfers, including those from Europe. In practice, the European Union’s political support does not amount to unlimited grant funding to complete every stage of the Turin-Lyon line. This also implies the possibility of finding alternative solutions, such as a concession model involving risk capital. In short, the picture is far from clear or settled.
Josiane Beaud, the French representative at the Intergovernmental Conference, also added fuel to the fire. In truth, the French intervention did not come out of the blue, as France’s wait-and-see approach to the design and construction of the national section under its responsibility has long been known. After acknowledging the delay, which is now clearly borne out by the facts, Josiane Beaud indicated 2045 as the approximate horizon for the entry into service of the French access section, with construction sites not due to open before 2038. That would be at least a decade after the expected completion of the cross-border railway with the Mont Cenis base tunnel.
France’s position could be described as inconsistent and cannot go unnoticed. After initially considering the construction, even if only partial, of not one but two separate high-capacity lines between the French entrance to the base tunnel and Lyon, one intended for fast passenger services and the other for freight traffic, the French decision-maker has postponed any intervention indefinitely, repeatedly outlining a project that is increasingly reduced and limited in both route and characteristics.
Doubts over the actual availability of EU funds are not new. The issue had already been raised clearly in a detailed analysis put forward by the Turin-Lyon technical commission established by the Unione Montana Valle Susa (Valle Susa Mountain Union). Although this document may be regarded as reflecting a position critical of the project, its observations on the EU budget left little room for interpretation. Since 2000, the European Union has made €1.9 billion available through funds included in TEN-T programmes up to 2013 and CEF Transport up to 2027. Overall, the Unione Montana commission noted, this amounts to about 12% of the current estimated cost of the base tunnel and less than 7% of all works envisaged on this corridor by 2033.
The key point is that the European Union has limited flexibility in disbursing funds because programming is rigid and embedded in budget cycles. The next one will be the future CEF-T 2028-2034 programme, to be defined in the coming years, with a financial envelope that already appears insufficient and will necessarily require recourse to future funds identified in the 2042 programming cycle, if not even 2050. The Turin-Lyon line risks moving further and further away.
Piermario Curti Sacchi
