Faulty components from an F-35 fighter aircraft, shipped from Australia to the United States for repair, ended up in Hong Kong, a territory barred under US arms export regulations even as a transit point because it falls within the orbit of the People's Republic of China. The Pentagon's Joint Program Office, which oversees the fighter aircraft programme, has acknowledged "a shipping issue" involving "unserviceable" components and says it is working with US authorities and industry partners to recover them, investigate the incident and introduce safeguards. On 22 September 2026, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles confirmed that the government in Canberra was cooperating with Washington and Lockheed Martin in the investigations and reviewing what had happened on the Australian side.
The incident, first reported by Politico on 18 September, exposes a little-seen aspect of military logistics: F-35 spare parts are largely transported through commercial networks arranged by the prime contractor using freight forwarders and civilian carriers. The US House and Senate Armed Services Committees are examining the case. On 29 September, Senator Tom Cotton asked Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth to review contractor-managed logistics chains and the use of commercial carriers, while Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi called for an investigation.
Official statements confirm only part of the account. They confirm the diversion, the condition of the components and efforts to recover them. Almost everything else comes from a single Bloomberg investigation, based on anonymous sources and subsequently repeated by numerous outlets, including the Australian Financial Review, without independent corroboration. The three people who told Politico that Pentagon and State Department officials had briefed congressional committee staff as early as June, months before the story became public, were also anonymous. According to Bloomberg's account, the consignment left in late May on a route involving stops in South Korea and Taiwan before arriving in San Francisco. Following an initial delay, UPS allegedly added Hong Kong to the route to speed up delivery. DSV, which had arranged the shipment on behalf of Lockheed Martin, had sent a notice about the transit restrictions imposed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), but the carrier employee who made the change reportedly did not see it. This detail, published on 7 October, was attributed to a single person familiar with the matter. An update to the same investigation suggested that the warning may have passed through a different IT system from the one used by the employee.
Bloomberg also reported that the components may have ended up in the hands of the Chinese authorities, and this is the weakest part of the entire account. When the story first broke, Politico said it was unclear both why the shipment had been diverted and who held the material. Asked by the Associated Press, China's Foreign Ministry said it was unaware of the incident, while the Hong Kong government declined to comment. No publicly available source contains any customs, judicial or administrative order documenting a seizure, identifying the authority responsible or setting out its legal basis. The nature of the consignment is also known only indirectly. Two of Politico's sources referred to a cockpit canopy, while Bloomberg also mentioned a weapons bay door and said both were coated with radar-absorbent material. On 21 September, Australian Defence Magazine described the components as "classified", without providing evidence of their classification. The following day, however, Marles played down their significance, cautiously telling broadcaster ABC: "From what I understand," he said, "there is a certain degree of reassurance" that the components were not sensitive.
The return journey to the United States was part of a maintenance procedure. According to Politico and Australian Defence Magazine, no Australian facility at the time could repair the canopies of the country's fleet of 72 F-35As. The canopy is an acrylic structure covered by a thin radar-absorbent coating that deteriorates over time and needs repairing or replacing. The designation "unserviceable" describes the components' operational condition, not their technological value. J.J. Gertler, a former military aviation analyst at the Congressional Research Service, told Politico that having a physical example allows information obtained through other means to be checked or refined.
It remains unclear which party was responsible for preventing a change of route. Politico describes a shared pool of spare parts stored at locations around the world and drawn on by countries participating in the programme. The US Department of Defense retains ownership until the parts are installed on aircraft, while Lockheed Martin manages the supply chain, maintains inventory records and contracts commercial operators to transport them. In a statement reported by Bloomberg on 9 October, Lockheed stressed that its logistics decisions "are not made unilaterally", explaining that the US government designates approved transport options and that the company chooses the carrier best able to meet those parameters. The company says it complies with regulations and is working with the logistics provider involved, which it did not name, on preventive measures and closer oversight. Two Pentagon agencies distanced themselves from the shipment. US Transportation Command said it had not been involved in transporting or coordinating the consignment, while the Defense Logistics Agency said it had no statutory or regulatory authority to oversee prime contractors' internal shipping protocols. These responses concern different levels of responsibility from the one described by Lockheed and do not contradict its account. But the central question remains unanswered: who was responsible, in practice, for ensuring that a change to the route did not take the cargo to Hong Kong?
A 2023 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), cited by Politico, had already identified problems with F-35 spare-parts accounting. According to the report, more than one million aircraft components had gone missing over the previous five years. It also highlighted difficulties faced by the Department of Defense in reviewing losses worth tens of millions of dollars because the relevant information was held by contractors. The missing spare parts were not necessarily stolen, as the GAO's findings also concerned the difficulty of tracing where they had gone. Nevertheless, the findings raise questions about military logistics, particularly at a time of heightened international tensions.
If Bloomberg's account is confirmed, attention should therefore shift from a single employee's mistake to the process that allowed a shipment subject to ITAR restrictions to be rebooked via a prohibited transit point. It is also unclear who was authorised to change the route, whether the change required fresh approval from DSV or Lockheed Martin, and when the arrival in Hong Kong was detected. It also remains to be established who had access to the components. Other questions remain unanswered: who had authority to alter the route and subject to what checks; whether fresh approval from DSV or Lockheed Martin was required; when tracking showed the consignment had arrived in Hong Kong; and who physically handled the packages. Bloomberg reports that compliance with export regulations is being examined by the State Department office responsible for arms trade, as well as by defence authorities. The accounts available contain no statements from UPS or DSV, and no penalties, formal allegations, contract suspensions or disciplinary measures have been announced so far. To date, none of the authorities involved has reported recovering the components or published a final report on the incident.
Antonio Illariuzzi
