If there is an Italian railway line on the core network that can be compared to the long and difficult modernisation of the Salerno-Reggio Calabria motorway, it is the Venice Mestre-Trieste. For more than 25 years, discussion has revolved around a project in which the debate has focused not only on the choice of route – entirely legitimate – but even on whether a new line should be built at all, as the natural continuation of the Turin-Milan-Venice high-speed corridor.
The latest chapter in this long-running saga, which has revived interest in a project that seemed to have disappeared from the headlines, came in February 2026 with the signing of a Legality Protocol “al fine di prevenire e contrastare le infiltrazioni della criminalità organizzata in materia di appalti di lavori, servizi e forniture pubbliche”. The document was signed by the relevant Prefectures (local offices of the Ministry of the Interior), Rfi and the extraordinary commissioner overseeing the project.
On that occasion, the rail infrastructure manager stated that “the overall value of works currently under way amounts to approximately €220 million, partly financed with PNRR funds”. It should be recalled that the full life-cycle cost of the Venice Mestre-Trieste upgrade, according to the latest identified solution, stands at €1.8bn, a figure estimated before the recent increases in raw material and energy prices. It must also be specified that this limited sum has so far been allocated to technological upgrades and has not affected the construction of new infrastructure.
To understand the project’s troubled origins, it is necessary to step back. At a time when even the most cautious cost-benefit analyses gave way to the visionary drive behind major infrastructure works, and in line with what was already planned and under construction on the high-speed network, a new high-speed line from Venice to Trieste was proposed to complete the Po Valley corridor. The 155-kilometre route, designed for speeds of 300 km/h and effectively reserved for passenger traffic, would have required an investment of no less than €8bn.
The project envisaged a close alignment with the Venice-Trieste motorway. However, at the end of the 2000s the route was modified at the request of the Regione Veneto (Veneto Regional Authority) to speed up the construction of the motorway’s third lane, avoiding further impacts on the cost of rebuilding overpasses to accommodate the railway line. An alternative “coastal” alignment was therefore proposed, located further from the hinterland and closer to the sea. Strong opposition from local authorities ultimately led to the project – developed by Italferr and delivered in 2010 – being shelved before it even reached the Environmental Impact Assessment stage.
In the meantime, and with greater realism, the plan to build a completely new line appeared oversized given the capacity of the existing railway, which was more than sufficient for both current and potential demand. This led to the current approach: a series of targeted interventions, including technological upgrades on various sections and the construction of several bypasses at Portogruaro, Latisana, over the Isonzo river, and between Ronchi dei Legionari and Aurisina. However, these variants have struggled to reach the detailed design stage due to difficult negotiations with local authorities. As a result, of the indicative €1.8bn planned expenditure, the railways have so far managed to implement works worth just over €200m.
One further detail: despite being a key corridor, there are still 20 level crossings between Venice Mestre and Trieste that interfere with the road network, although there were as many as 32 in 2010. The upgrade and modernisation project primarily addresses their removal. Yet progress remains slow and, judging by current indications, not all stakeholders appear to share a sense of urgency about modernising this railway corridor.
Piermario Curti Sacchi
