At the end of February 2026, the Houthi movement announced its decision to resume attacks on maritime routes in the Red Sea and against Israel. Leaders of the Iranian-backed Yemeni group reportedly approved new operations using missiles and drones against vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a compulsory passage for the Suez Canal, with the possibility of a first strike within hours of the statements.
The announcement comes in the wake of joint United States and Israeli strikes on targets in Iran and is explicitly linked to the regional escalation. The Houthis have also reiterated that operations in the Red Sea are tied to developments in the conflict in Gaza and that any deterioration of the truce could constitute a further trigger for hostilities against commercial shipping.
The movement controls the Yemeni capital Sana’a and large areas of the north of the country, including stretches of territory overlooking the Red Sea. From these areas, between November 2023 and early 2025, dozens of attacks were launched against merchant vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the southern Red Sea. Many shipowners subsequently diverted vessels along the Cape of Good Hope route, extending transit times by up to two weeks on Asia–Europe services, with consequences for slot availability, fleet rotation and insurance costs.
A partial suspension of operations followed the Gaza ceasefire of 10 October 2025. At that stage, the Houthis announced the end of the campaign against commercial vessels and Israeli ports, while reserving the right to resume actions in the event of a breach of the truce. During 2025, attacks declined and some traffic gradually returned to the Red Sea, albeit in a context of continued caution among shipping lines.
The risk, however, has not disappeared. On 13 January 2026, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2812 (2026), extending for six months the mandate for the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting on risks linked to Houthi activities against traffic in the Red Sea. In the text, the security environment is described as “extremely volatile” and it is underlined that the movement retains the capability to target commercial routes despite any operational pauses, as reported in the official United Nations statement.
As early as 25 January 2026, the Houthis released a video message threatening “new attacks” on shipping in the Red Sea, accompanied by images of a vessel in flames and the word “Soon”, without further details. The warning came as a United States aircraft carrier was approaching the region amid rising tensions with Tehran.
A renewed wave of attacks would have differentiated effects across traffic segments. Container vessels are highly sensitive due to the immediate impact on rotations and the scheduling of liner services between Asia and Europe. Tankers and gas carriers are exposed because of the value of their cargo and the environmental and insurance implications in the event of damage. Bulk carriers and general cargo vessels would also face consequences in terms of delivery times and insurance premiums.
Shipowners’ decisions in the coming weeks will depend on whether the announced attacks materialise and on their intensity. A limited number of incidents, but with high visibility, could be enough to trigger large-scale diversions around the Cape of Good Hope, with repercussions for freight rates, slot availability and port congestion in Europe. Even a contained level of attacks can generate disproportionate effects on risk perception and operational choices.
