After reigniting the conflict with Yemen’s Aden Government, the administration regarded internationally as legitimate, Houthi militants are reported to have taken control of the port city of Al-Makha, also known as Mocha, on the Red Sea coast less than 80 kilometres from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Three officials from the same Yemeni government told Reuters on 10 September 2026. So far, Houthi communication channels have provided no confirmation, while the National Resistance Forces led by Tareq Saleh, which are allied with the Aden government, say a Houthi commander did indeed lead a military contingent into Mocha on Thursday morning, but that the reorganisation of the city’s defences is continuing in coordination with the anti-Houthi coalition. The same government sources said their troops are withdrawing towards the Dhubab district, closer to the strait, to reinforce their deployment in the area.
The episode comes at the height of a Houthi ground offensive launched in early September along the fronts of western Taiz and southern Hodeidah, using infantry, ballistic missiles, drones and artillery. The Aden government has responded by deploying its air force, carrying out more than 15 strikes against Houthi positions in the two provinces. Casualties since the start of the offensive have exceeded 190, according to a toll cited by regional agencies, while the Yemeni government reports more than 20,000 displaced people over the past two weeks in the provinces of Taiz and Hodeidah.
Mocha had already been under Houthi control until 2017, when government forces managed to capture it with the support of a Saudi-led coalition. Control of the city is strategically important not only because of its port, but also because the surrounding coastal and mountainous belt provides access to the Dhubab district, the closest point to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and to the island of Perim, also known as Mayyun, which overlooks the narrowest section of Bab el-Mandeb. The western highlands of Taiz would also make it possible to observe and target infrastructure and coastal traffic with greater precision. Possession of Mocha, however, is not enough to secure full control of the strait, which also depends on the Djibouti and Eritrea shores, the island of Perim, the international naval presence and the missile and intelligence capabilities of the parties involved. Even so, a consolidation of the Houthis’ grip on the port city would reduce their territorial distance from the coast’s most sensitive points. The port had already been severely hit in August, so its operations were already seriously compromised before the reported seizure of the city.
For maritime transport, the risk does not depend solely on any physical occupation of the shores of the strait, because the Houthis have already shown they can influence insurance risk through missiles, drones and selective threats against vessels. The latest joint JMIC-UKMTO update, covering the period from 1 March to 6 September, shows that traffic through Bab el-Mandeb has stabilised below the average recorded before the naval blockade announced by the Houthis on 20 July, mainly as a result of the rerouting of tankers, at least those not in the Houthis’ sights. The real risk at present is for vessels linked to Saudi Arabia, which face rising insurance premiums and possible diversions via the Cape of Good Hope, with higher fuel consumption and lower vessel rotation.
As they advance into territory administered by Aden, the Houthis are intensifying attacks against Saudi Arabia. In recent days, missiles and drones have struck the southern cities of Khamis Mushait, Abha and Najran, as well as energy facilities in Jizan. Aramco’s Jizan refinery, which produces 400,000 barrels per day, has been hit twice in a month, on 9 August and on 7-8 September, and was temporarily out of service on both occasions.
M.L.
