With a steady rise in interference affecting global navigation satellite systems, Gnss, air transport is facing a tangible threat to flight safety. In response to this trend, the International Air Transport Association and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency on 18 June 2025 announced a joint action plan aimed at addressing these growing challenges in a structured and effective way. The strategy stems from the conclusions of an international workshop hosted at Easa's headquarters in Cologne, bringing together over 120 experts from regulatory bodies, industry, research institutes and international organisations.
According to data gathered by Iata through the Global Aviation Data Management Flight Data eXchange system, between 2021 and 2024 the number of GPS signal loss events rose by 220 per cent. This sharp increase reflects both the instability of the current geopolitical landscape and the growing reliance of civil aviation on satellite technologies. Initially, responses to interference were limited in scope and focused on containing the most immediate effects. Today, however, the situation has evolved. “Gnss disruptions are not only more frequent, but also more complex. It is no longer enough to contain them: we need to build real system resilience,” said Jesper Rasmussen, Easa’s Flight Standards Director. His remarks were echoed by Nick Careen, Iata’s Senior Vice President for Operations, Safety and Security, who emphasised the need for immediate action and global coordination, especially in view of the upcoming Icao assembly.
The action plan developed by Easa and Iata is based on four main operational areas, each intended to strengthen the sector’s ability to respond and adapt to interference. Firstly, it includes improvements in monitoring and reporting activities, with the introduction of standard radio call-outs and consistent message coding for flight crews, as well as real-time alert procedures and faster information sharing among stakeholders.
Secondly, there is a strong focus on prevention and mitigation, through tighter controls on the export and use of jamming devices, and the development of technical solutions to reduce false alarms, detect localised interference and ensure rapid equipment recovery in the event of signal loss.
The third area concerns infrastructure and airspace management. The plan advocates maintaining traditional radionavigation systems as a backup safety network, integrating military air traffic management capabilities, and adopting more effective protocols for handling emergencies and diversions. Finally, the document stresses the importance of cooperation between civil and military authorities, particularly in sharing data on interference, and the need to prepare for emerging threats, including risks associated with drone use.
